Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015)
Volume 5

Issue 1

Article 17

1989

Parham v. J.R.: Civil Psychiatric Commitment of Minors
Susan A. Turner

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp

Recommended Citation
Susan A. Turner, Parham v. J.R.: Civil Psychiatric Commitment of Minors, 5 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y
263 (1989).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp/vol5/iss1/17

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) by an authorized editor of CUA
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

CASE-COMMENTS
PARHAM v. J.R.: CIVIL PSYCHIATRIC
COMMITMENT OF MINORS
In general, the laws and policies of this country affecting minors reflect a
judicial effort to protect this special class of individuals from harm inflicted
upon them by either themselves or others.' Yet, the civil psychiatric commitment procedures for minors are an anomaly and do not reflect this strong
judicial effort to protect children. Not only are special procedures absent
where children are concerned, but most of the ordinary constitutional safeguards available to adults have been deemed unnecessary by the U.S.
Supreme Court when a child faces a deprivation of his or her liberty through
psychiatric commitment.
This Comment discusses three aspects of civil commitment of minors: the
current commitment procedures approved by the Supreme Court, a comparison between due process requirements for adults and children, and a comparison between commitment of children through the civil system versus the
criminal system.
This analysis is followed by recommendations for alternatives, when commitment of a minor is indeed appropriate, in order that involuntary psychiatric commitment may accomplish its goals of benevolent treatment and reintroduction of the child into functioning society.
THE SUPREME COURT'S VIEW

In 1979, after a year and a half of deliberation on the issue, the Supreme
Court, in a 5-1-3 decision, established the guidelines under which minors
may be committed to state administered mental health care facilities. 2 The
1. For example, persons under the age of sixteen may not drive automobiles because of
the inherent dangerousness of the vehicle to themselves and to other drivers on the road. See
Nebraska ex rel. Oleson v. Graunke, 119 Neb. 440, 229 N.W. 329 (1930); Berberian v. Petit,
118 R.I. 448, 374 A.2d 791 (1977). Minors are not held liable for their contracts so as to
discourage businessmen from taking advantage of their inexperience in the marketplace. See
IA A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, 227 at 335 (1963). Special procedures exist within
the criminal law system to segregate juvenile offenders from the dangers they would encounter
in adult prisons. U.S. v. Frasquillo-Zomosa, 626 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,449 U.S.
987; U.S. v. Canniff, 521 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1059 (1976).
2. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). This suit was originally filed on behalf of two

264

Journalof Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 5:263

issue presented in Parhamv. JR. was whether a child facing commitment to
a state mental hospital was entitled, under the Constitution, to an adversarial hearing before being hospitalized. The Court referred to three factors
which must be balanced in making such a due process analysis: the private
interest alleged to be affected by the challenged action, the risk to that private interest by the action and the probable value of additional procedural
safeguards, and the governmental interest affected by the imposition of such
additional safeguards. 3
Utilizing these three factors, the Court in Parham held that the Constitution does not compel a pre-commitment adversarial hearing for minors.
Adequate safeguards of a child's liberty interests were found to exist when a
state institution has in place procedures where admission decisions are made
by a "neutral factfinder" 5 and where justification for continued care is accomplished through periodic review of the child's mental and emotional status. 6 Unfortunately, the Parham decision rests on logical inconsistencies, a
misinterpretation of the data, and a blurring of the issues.
The Court began by identifying the child's interest in not being committed
as the primary private interest affected by a commitment procedure." Yet,
when the balancing equation was written out, the Court concluded that
when a child is recommended for psychiatric commitment, the actual private
interest in question is a combination of the child's liberty interest coupled
with the parents' interests and obligations for the welfare and health of their
child. The Court viewed these two separate interests as "inextricably
linked." 8 The Court's inclusion of the parents' interest in performing their
familial obligations to the child effectively tipped the scale in this delicate
balance away from the effect of commitment on the child to the effect of
non-commitment of the child on the family.
A focus on parental rights, rather than on the rights of the child facing
commitment, is further emphasized in the Court's conclusion that absent a
finding of neglect or abuse, parents should be afforded the substantial, if not
dominant, role in the decision to institutionalize their children. 9 Yet, the
proposed mechanism for determining neglect or abuse of their children youngsters, J.R. and J.L. While the suit was pending review by the Supreme Court, J.L. died

as an inpatient in the Georgia State Hospital.
3. Id. at 599-600 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
4. Id. at 620.
5. Id. at 606.
6. Id. at 607.
7. Id. at 600.
8. Id.

9. Id. at 604.
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the precommitment hearing - was rejected by the Court. 1" Rather, a
child's liberty rights were held to be dependent on a presumption that parents act in the best interests of their children. In performing the Parham
balancing test in that case, the Court gave greater weight to the privacy
interests of the family than to the liberty interests of the child. The Court
noted that some families might be dissuaded from seeking psychiatric admission for their children if such care was made contingent on a proceeding
which would probe their parental motives or delve into other private family
matters." This supposition implies a greater concern for the presumed integrity of the family unit than for liberty interests of any particular individual member of that protected family.
In Parham, the Court considered whether a distinction in procedure for
commitment should exist between a child who lives with his or her natural
parents and a child who is a ward of the state.' 2 The majority determined
that such a distinction was not necessary and that special procedures were
not required for a child who was a ward of the state to protect his individual
privacy interest in not being committed. The strongest dissents centered on
this issue. It was argued that the presumption that an adversarial hearing
need not be performed when a parent volunteers his or her child - because
of a tradition that parents act in their child's best interest - fails when the
state is seeking to commit a minor. It was recommended by the dissent, but
rejected by the majority, that a two-tier system for minors be instituted one for children living with their parents and one for children who are wards
3
of the state.1
The Court did acknowledge that there was some "risk of error inherent in
the parental decision to have a child institutionalized.' 4 Therefore, Parham
addressed this concern by setting up a requirement for evaluation of the
child by a "neutral factfinder."' 5 Yet, the decision upholds, as indicative of
"neutral factfinding," admission of a child after evaluation by the psychiatric
staff of the same hospital into which admission is sought. 16 Data from 1980
10. Id. at 605. The Court characterized the proposed preadmission hearing as "timeconsuming procedural minuets." Id.

11. Id.
12. Id. at 617-18.
13. Id. at 637. In reaching this position in Parham, the Court ignored its earlier decision
of In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) that held that although the State purports to act in the
juvenile's best interests under a parens patriae rationale, the State's good intentions provide no
substitute for procedural due process protection. In Re Gault, 387 U.S. at 16.
14. Parham, 442 U.S. at 606.

15. Id.
16. Id. The Court established a presumption that state employed mental health professionals are. . . "[c]onscientious public employees [who] implement the State's beneficent pur-
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indicate that the median stay for children up to the age of fourteen held in
state and county mental hospitals was ninety-two days; for children aged
fifteen to seventeen, discharge from the psychiatric hospital, either private or
state managed, usually occurred within thirty days.
By contrast, children in the same age groups in private psychiatric hospitals and non-federal general hospitals were discharged in one-half to onequarter the time.17 The figures cited above lend strong support to the findings of the groups who filed amici curiae briefs in the Parham case that
hospital administrators may not actually be neutral and detached because of
institutional financial pressures to admit a child who may not have need for
hospital care.18
Perhaps the most egregious error in the Parham decision resulted from
the Court's abdication of its responsibility to set standards and guidelines for
the constitutional deprivation of an individual's, albeit a child's, right to liberty. In this case, a parent's right to volunteer his or her child for psychiatric admission was analogized to the rights of a parent to seek emergency
medical admission for a child. 19 Yet, with the exception of suicidal behavior, psychiatric disorders, as opposed to medical emergencies, are rarely immediately life-threatening.2 ° Rather, mental and/or emotional disorders
tend to impact on the quality of life, as opposed to the continuation of life.
Thus, these disorders usually afford mental health care professionals and the
family realistic opportunities to make the most beneficial arrangements for
the child's therapy without the time constraints notable in medical
emergencies.
Further, the Court's denial of pre-admission hearings subjects the rights of
liberty and privacy for juveniles to the "vagaries of haphazard application""
of unclear criteria and standards. The field of psychiatry, and child psychiatry in particular, is not an exact science. Psychiatric diagnosis is more subjective than medical diagnosis, and, therefore, it is in need of greater judicial
review. A psychiatrist can manipulate the symbols and labels of "mental
poses . . ." and that allegations of other than such behavior could.

"be dealt with

individually." Id. at 616.
17. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL
HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH STATISTICAL NOTE No. 175 (April 1986). Male children under

the age of fifteen are usually held longer than females of the same age; females of and over the
age of fifteen are held longer than their male counterparts. Id. at 27.
18. Parham, 442 U.S. at 616.
19. Id. at 603.
20. J.GIBBS, SUICIDE 64 (1968) (Suicide is rare in the extremely young, defined as below
the age of ten. In the age group ten to fourteen years, the suicide rate is 1 in 100,000; the rate
for the age group fifteen to nineteen then jumps to 5.9 in 100,000. The suicide rate doubles in
the age group twenty to twenty-four and steadily increases until age eighty-five).
21. Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278, 294 (D. Md. 1979).
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illness" so that a person is sometimes sick, sometimes not sick. A person
may be labeled sick so that medical insurance will pay for his treatment, but
not sick so that his employment is not jeopardized. Unlike doctors in other
fields of medicine, the psychiatrist has great freedom to shift diagnostic labels, to apply them at one time and not at another, or to apply them for one
purpose and not for another.2 2
For example, until 1973, homosexual behavior was considered a treatable
psychiatric condition.2 3 Indeed, behavior modification and aversion therapies were considered standard practice in the psychiatric field for patients
who exhibited even homosexual fantasies. In 1973, however, the American
Psychiatric Association altered its view about homosexuality as a "condition," and recommended treatment only when the individual "explicitly
states [that his/her homosexuality] has been unwanted, and [is] a persistent
source of distress [for him/her]. 2 4 Moreover, since the newest edition of
the psychiatric diagnostic manual was issued, other social behaviors have
fallen from grace. Insurance companies now pay medical benefits for the
"diagnoses" of "alcoholic jealousy,, 25 "non-compliance with medical treatment, ' ' 2 6 and "caffeine intoxication. '2 7 In the specialized field of child psychiatry, a person under the age of eighteen may be diagnosed and treated as
an inpatient if he or she suffers from "stuttering,, 28 "shyness disorder, ' 29 or
"oppositional disorder of adolescence. "30
22. J. ROBITSCHER, THE POWERS OF PSYCHIATRY 164 (1980).
23. Id. at 170. It is interesting to note that prior to 1961, homosexuality was not viewed
as a psychiatric illness, but rather was a crime in most states. Thus, we have seen a social
behavior first decriminalized, and now, fortunately, declassified from a mental illness to an
alternative lifestyle.
24. American Psychiatric Association, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 281 (3rd ed. 1980).
25. Id. at 413. This diagnosis is considered a paranoid psychosis, a serious categorization,
manifested by jealousy experienced while intoxicated.
26. Id. at 333. This diagnosis can be made even in light of knowledge of religious beliefs
that preclude compliance with recommended medical treatment, or a "considered decision
that the treatment is worse than the illness." Id. The DSM-III acknowledges that this diagnosis may be made in the absence of a finding of mental disorder.
27. Id. at 160-61. This diagnosis can be made if at least five of the following symptoms
are found: insomnia, restlessness, nervousness, excitement, flushed face, stomach complaints,
muscle twitching, cardiac problems, periods of inexhaustibility, or water loss. Id. The condition is considered an organic mental disorder, a condition directly attributable to a brain defect
rather than an emotional or psychological disturbance.
28. Id. at 78-79. Stuttering is included as a diagnosis because of the possibility that the
affected person may suffer from "teasing and social ostracism by peers [which] may result in
impaired peer relations... [or] academic difficulties if [the child] avoids speaking in class." Id.
29. Id. at 53-54. This condition is characterized by "persistent... shrinking from contact
with strangers ... [and] a clear desire for affection and acceptance." Id. These children,
according to the DSM-III, are unassertive and lack self-confidence.
30. Id. at 63-64. This diagnosis may be made if two of the following symptoms are found:
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It should be noted that children can be very symptomatic yet suffer from
no serious psychological problems. For instance, ninety-five percent of children will develop a phobia, and thirty to forty percent will develop night
terrors.3" Although these behaviors can indeed be very disruptive in a family setting, the decision of whether they are indicative of a mental or emotional disturbance should be made by a psychiatric professional after an
examination of the child, but prior to institutionalization and the severe deprivation of liberty that this would entail. Child psychiatrists acknowledge
that a relationship may exist between inappropriate juvenile behavior and
underlying familial discord.3 2 Justice Brennan in his dissent in Parham
noted numerous studies revealing that parental decisions to institutionalize
their children often are the result of a dislocation in the family unrelated to
the child's mental condition.33
The second prong of the Parham due process analysis concerns the risks
to a child's liberty interest posed by a wrongful commitment. The Court
dismissed the argument that a psychiatric hospitalization may produce adverse social consequences - a stigma - for the child. The Court held that a
child is not stigmatized by the commitment, but rather by the symptomatology that led to the commitment.3 4
This holding is inconsistent with the realities of the consequences of psychiatric hospitalization. In a concurring opinion in Parham,Justice Stewart
echoed the concerns of Justice Brennan, that the "aberrant behavior may
disappear, while the fact of past hospitalization lasts forever.", 35 For examviolation of minor rules set by parents, teachers or other authority figures; temper tantrums;
argumentativeness; provocative behavior; or stubbornness. Using these criteria, almost every
child in the United States would be subject to involuntary commitment under Parham.
31. W. GOOD AND J. NELSON, PSYCHIATRY MADE RIDICULOUSLY SIMPLE 56 (1984).
32. Id. at 60-61. The authors suggest that a "VACUUM" test be employed by psychiatrists when evaluating a child for potential hospital admission:
V: Violence is often present in the family of a child who has committed an antiso-

cial act (i.e. hurt someone, stolen).
A:

Alcoholism is more common in families with children who exhibit antisocial
behavior.
C: Child abuse is frequently found in his family.
U: Unempathic parenting often leads to antisocial behavior.

U: Underprivileged environment may teach a child as well as his family.
M: Maternal deprivation may cause anger in the child to be vented through antisocial acts.
Clearly the focus here for any potential juvenile admission is to evaluate the family before any
successful treatment of the child can be undertaken. Id. at 61.
33. Parham, 442 U.S. at 632.

34. Id. at 601. The Court observed that "[a] person needing, but not receiving, appropriate medical care may well face even greater social ostracism resulting from the observable
symptoms of an untreated disorder" (footnote omitted). Id.
35. Id. at 622 n.3.
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pie, a former psychiatric patient is automatically disqualified from state and
municipal civil service ranking;36 many professional schools (even medical
schools) may deny a former mental patient admission solely because of his
hospitalization history.37 Many official forms such as applications for employment, driver's licenses, licenses to carry a gun, or voter's registration ask
whether the applicant has ever been a patient in a mental hospital.3 8 Only
one state statute contains a provision prohibiting discrimination against former mental patients; however, the provision only applies to and protects voluntary patients. 39 Further, the Court ignored the fact that childhood and
adolescence are formative years, and hence, the effects of an erroneous hospitalization may leave deeper scars on a child than on an adult.
The Parham court was concerned that requiring a formalized fact-finding
hearing before a child could be admitted to an institution would pose a significant intrusion into the parent-child relationship. The Court analyzed the
possible effects of such an adversarial process on the child's return to his
home after hospitalization.'
However, throughout the opinion, the Court
neglected to consider the possibility that the pathology attributed to the
child may rest rather within the family structure. The dissent urged recognition of studies that revealed that oftentimes committed children are simply
scapegoats for deep-seated family conflicts, and urged that the majority's
presumption that parents act in their children's best interest is often not applicable in the civil commitment context. 4 Indeed, the dissent offered the
opinion that a child who has been ousted from his family has even greater
needs for an independent advocate than other persons for whom psychiatric
admission is sought.42 It should be noted that if a child should be erroneously admitted by his parents, no escape mechanism exists for his release;
the persons who are authorized to commit the child are the same ones au4 3
thorized to seek his release in the event of a mistake in hospitalization.
The third prong of the Parham due process analysis, the interests of the
state, is essentially economic - confining the use of costly mental health
36. T. SZASZ, INSANITY: THE IDEA AND ITS
37. Id.

CONSEQUENCES

59 (1987).

38. See generally B. ENNIS, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 85 (1973).

39. New York Mental Hygiene Law § 33.01: "Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, no person shall be deprived of any civil right, .. . solely by reason of receipt of services for
a mental disability .. " Id.
40. Parham, 442 U.S. at 610.
41. Id. at 632.
42. Id. at 631.
43. Mabbutt, Juveniles, Mental Hospital Commitment and Civil Rights: The Case of

Parham v. J.R., 19 J. FAM. L. 27, 34 (1980-81).
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facilities to cases of genuine need.'
The Court admonished that
"[b]ehavioral experts in courtrooms and hearings [rather than in the hospital] are of little help to patients,"4 5 and that the cost of additional procedural
safeguards would have to come from the monies allocated to the mental
healthcare budget from the state legislature.4 6 It is interesting to note that
the Court failed to consider that the cost of the evaluation of the child's
mental status is a constant figure - the same money is expended if the child
is interviewed before admission or after. Had the dissent in Parham prevailed, the scarce funds allocated for mental health care could be spent more
efficiently and productively by providing a diagnosis to the treating psychiatrist at the time of admission rather than at some undetermined point in the
future.
The Parham decision allows a child to be admitted to a psychiatric hospital solely on the recommendation of his or her parents, and requires only
that a "neutral factfinder" perform an evaluation of the child within a reasonable period of time after the hospitalization. It requires nothing more
from the state for protection of a child's right to liberty. It should be noted
that a child committed by his parents is considered a voluntary admission,47
while an adult committed against his wishes on the recommendation of a
physician or any other person, or by the court, is considered an involuntary
admission.4 8 It is primarily this fiction in definition that has allowed for the
denial of due process rights for psychiatrically committed children.
THE RIGHTS OF AN ADULT FACED WITH INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT

In a concurring opinion in O'Connorv. Donaldson,49 Chief Justice Burger
stated that, "there can be no doubt that involuntary commitment to a mental
hospital, like an involuntary confinement of an individual for any reason, is a
deprivation of liberty which the State cannot accomplish without due pro44. Parham, 442 U.S. at 604-05.
45. Id. at 606. See also Silverstein, Civil Commitment ofMinors: Due and Undue Process,
58 N.C.L. REV. 1133, 1140 (1980). However, Silverstein points out that the primary objections to pre-admission hearings come from the mental health professionals, rather than from
the legal profession or the families involved in the proceeding. In general, the families fear that
an adversarial proceeding will make the rapport necessary for later treatment of the patient
more difficult.
46. Parham, 442 U.S. at 606.
47. Ellis, Volunteering Children: ParentalCommitment of Minors to Mental Institutions,
62 CAL. L. REV. 840 (1974).
48. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.30.690 (1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17205f(a) (West 1988); OFFICIAL CODE OF GA. ANN. § 37-3-20(a) (1982); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 34-B, § 3831 (1964); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 330.1415 (West 1988).
49. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
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cess of law." 5 ° O'Connor established that the state's interest in committing
an adult must be demonstrated in an appropriate proceeding prior to that
commitment.
Equally important, O'Connor set a standard - admittedly broad, but a
standard nonetheless - for involuntary hospitalization of adults. Under
that standard, "no constitutional basis [exists] for confining ... persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom.'
In O'Connor, dangerousness was not equated with eccentricity or nuisance
behavior. However, at least one state statute has defined dangerousness so
broadly as to include not only an individual's potential for suicide or selfinjury, but also his or her inability to exercise self-control, judgment or discretion in the activities of daily living.52 Similarly, legislation is pending in
some states to allow for involuntary commitment of adults if a possibility of
dangerousness exists, rather than the current standard of requiring a demonstration of imminent danger of self-injury or injury to others before commit53
ment is authorized.
An adult facing involuntary commitment is entitled to an adversarial
hearing in which the necessity for hospitalization must be established by at
least clear and convincing evidence; some states require the mental illness to
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.54 Further, in an involuntary commitment proceeding, an adult is entitled to fair notice of the hearing, to counsel
to represent -his liberty interest, to the opportunity to offer evidence of his
own, and to cross-examine witnesses against him.55
An involuntarily admitted adult does not leave his constitutional rights at
the hospital admission office. Once the need for hospitalization has been
50. Id. at 580.
51. Id. at 575.
52. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT § 122C-3(1l) (Supp. 1986) which defines dangerousness to
oneself to include a demonstrated inability "to exercise self-control, judgment, and discretion
in the conduct of [one's] daily responsibilities and social relations, or to satisfy the need for
nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter or self-protection and safety" (footnote
omitted).
53. N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1986, at Cl, col. 1. The legislation pending in New York would
make it possible to commit persons who are unable to provide for basic needs such as shelter,
or would suffer "severe and abnormal mental, emotional or physical distress" if they are not
hospitalized. Id. The new law is expected by psychiatrists to allow for hospitalization to prevent future mental deterioration, as compared with the current involuntary commitment legislation which requires a demonstration of present dangerousness. The state of Washington
adopted such legislation in 1979 and studies reveal that the number of involuntary commitments in that state almost doubled by 1981.
54. See, e.g., MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 330.1465 (West 1980); Mo. STAT. ANN. §
632.335(4) (Vernon 1988); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15(B) (Anderson 1989); VT. STAT.
ANN. TIT. 18 § 7616(b) (1987); W. VA. CODE § 27-5-40)(3) (1986).
55. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494-95 (1980).
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determined through a judicial hearing, due process further requires that the
adult "receive such individual treatment as will give him a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition. ''5 6 Additionally, at
any time during the hospitalization, an adult may make application for release which must be reviewed by the hospital.5 7 If at the time of application
for release, the adult is not considered dangerous, he must be released. His
release is not contingent upon the completion of any prescribed therapy.5"
No such release mechanism exists for children committed involuntarily.
Rather than imposing specific guidelines for release of children, the Court in
Parham relied on periodic staff reviews of the child's mental status to safeguard the child's right to a speedy release; the period for review, however,
remained undefined. As noted previously, the state statutes that allow parents to volunteer their children for psychiatric treatment also allow the parents to voluntarily terminate that treatment. 59
The current trend in psychiatric hospitalization of adults is "de-institutionalization."' Under this plan, adults are kept in hospitals only until they
are no longer dangerous. Crisis management has become the goal of involuntary hospitalization, with treatment of underlying problems being reserved for voluntary patients. Due in large part to "de-institutionalization,"
from 1969 to 1983, the numbers of persons hospitalized per 100,000 population dropped from 859.1 to 799.1.61 Yet, between 1980 (the year following
the Parham decision) and 1984, a period during which psychiatrists have
claimed that pharmacological treatment of mental illness has made dangerousness easier to control and made hospitalization of otherwise dangerous
adults largely unnecessary, adolescent admissions to mental facilities increased more than 350%, from 10,765 to 48,375.62
56. Connor v. Donaldson, 442 U.S. 563, 572 (1975).
57. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 330.1465 (West 1980); Mo. STAT. ANN. §
632.335(4) (Vernon 1988); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15(B) (Anderson 1989); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18 § 7616(b) (1987); W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4(j)(3) (1986).
58. Release standards generally are defined in terms of an absence of the condition that
brought on commitment, i.e. dangerousness. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 330.1465
(West 1980); MO. STAT. ANN. § 632.335(4) (Vernon 1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5122.15(B) (Anderson 1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 7616(b) (1987); W. VA. CODE § 27-54()(3) (1986).
59. Mabbutt, Juveniles, Mental Hospital Commitment and Civil Rights: The Case of
Parham v. JR., 19 J. FAM. L. 27, 34 (1980-81).
60. Comment, Bitter Freedom: Deinstitutionalization and the Homeless, 3 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH

61.

L. & POL'Y 205 (1987).

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES, MENTAL HEALTH-UNITED STATES

34 (1987).
62. T. SZASZ,

INSANITY: THE IDEA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

108 (1987).
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COMMITMENT OF "CRIMINALS"

VERSUS CIVIL COMMITMENT

Because of the substantial liberty interest at stake, no one, adult or child,
may be imprisoned without due process of law.63 While in criminal proceedings a child's due process rights may attach somewhat later than do those of
an adult, many federal and state courts have held that detained juveniles
have constitutional rights. These rights are comparable to the rights of a
detained adult, calling for a probable cause determination prior to continued
detention." 4 One court has extended this protection to non-detained
juveniles as well.65 Some courts have found that, for children, a right to a
hearing to determine probable cause logically implies a right to counsel.66
However, regardless of when the right to due process protection attaches for
juveniles, it is important to note that children who are accused of committing crimes and who face possible criminal punishment are entitled to a hearing, a lawyer, and to have evidence presented on their behalf.67 This concept
is in stark contrast to the Court's holding in Parham, where no such due
process rights attach to a child volunteered by his parents or guardian even
after being committed to a mental hospital.
In 1966, thirteen years before the Parham decision, the Supreme Court
considered the rights of juvenile delinquents facing incarceration in a mental
hospital. The holding of In Re Gault61 made clear that when incarceration
in an institution may result, "it would be extraordinary if our Constitution
did not require the procedural regularity and exercise of care implied in the
phrase 'due process.' ,69 In Vitek v. Jones,7 ° the Court held that the involuntary transfer of a prisoner to a mental hospital implicates a liberty interest
protected by the due process clause.7 1 Interestingly, in Vitek, the Court considered the stigma that may attach to a prisoner who is transferred to a
mental hospital as a factor when determining his due process rights before
that transfer.72 Yet, the concept of a stigma from psychiatric hospitalization
for a child volunteered against his or her wishes was dismissed by the
Parham Court.7 3
63. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
64.

R. HORWITZ, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 430 (1984).

65. Brown v. Fauntleroy, 442 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
66. See, e.g., T.K. v. State, 126 Ga. App. 269, 190 S.E.2d 588 (1972); Doe v. State, 487
P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971).
67. R. HORWITZ, supra note 64, at 439.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 31.
445 U.S. 480 (1980).
Id. at 487-88.
Id. at 494.
Parham, 442 U.S. at 601.
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A person accused of a crime who suffers from a mental disease or defect at
the time the crime was committed has the option of raising a defense of
insanity at his trial. Even if mental disease or defect could be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt, the accused is not required to plead the insanity defense.74 Psychiatric detention does not carry with it a finite sentence as does
a prison term. Release from a psychiatric admission, as an alternative to a
prison sentence, is dependent solely upon subjective findings of the staff psychiatrists as to the convict's recovery. This is the same criteria used in the
determination of release for any involuntary psychiatric patient. 7 ' For this
reason, it is common for defense counsel not to put the insanity question into
issue.7 6 Issues of unreasonable punishment have also been raised by defendants facing psychiatric hospitalization because of the poor conditions of state
77
mental hospitals.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE SYSTEM
FOR COMMITMENT OF MINORS

Need for Diagnosis Before Treatment
Due process has been held to require that the nature and duration of the
commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.78 Logically, in order to determine the reasonable duration of psychiatric hospitalization, one must first determine the purpose
for that hospitalization. Parham makes that first step of a proper diagnosis
completely unnecessary in the case of minors who are admitted for psychiatric treatment against their wishes. An analysis of the economic effects of
requiring pre-admission hearings to determine the need for psychiatric hospitalization of a child (in light of the information available from the admitting parents) led the Parham Court to conclude that in the face of limited
resources, the benefit to individuals from such an additional safeguard was
79
substantially outweighed by the cost of providing such protection.
Unfortunately, the current data available on the costs of mental health
care does not support the Court's conclusion. In 1980, twenty-three percent
of all persons under the age of eighteen admitted for inpatient psychiatric
74. W. LAFAVE AND A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW § 4.5 (2nd ed. 1986).
75. Habeas corpus proceedings may be maintained by the person, criminally or civilly
committed, to show that he has regained his sanity. 21 ALR 2d 1004, 1006.
76. A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 20 (1967).
77. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
78. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972); See also Bell v. Wayne County General
Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085, 1096 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
79. Parham, 442 U.S. at 605-06 (citing Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1267, 1276 (1975)).
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services were hospitalized for less than one week." ° Most states, while they
do not require a pre-admission diagnostic hearing, do require an evaluation
at some point during the hospitalization."1
It would appear that some
youths may be "warehoused" in these institutions until such time as a diagnostic hearing finally reveals that there was no need for their hospitalization
in the first place. Since a psychiatrist must perform an evaluation of the
child at some point in the hospitalization process, either before the child is
admitted for care or at some time afterward, the dollar figure for evaluation
is therefore a constant one. The issue then should be when those dollars are
best spent. It is the opinion of this author that the most efficient use of these
scarce funds is made when the diagnosis is determined prior to admission.
Figures indicate that in 1979, on average, a state spent approximately
$70.00 per day to maintain a person as an inpatient in a mental hospital.8 2
This figure of $70.00 represented a twenty-five percent increase in costs from
1977, just two years previous.8 3 Extrapolating these figures, an erroneous
admission caught early in the hospitalization process (within a week) would
cost an institution the unnecessary amount of $490 ($70.00 per day times
seven days). Justice Brennan, dissenting in Parham, cited figures from 1975
that indicated that only thirty-six percent of patients below the age of twenty
confined at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D.C. actually required
psychiatric hospitalization. 8 4 Clearly, then, it is in the state's own best economic interests to screen potential state-supported hospital residents in order
to prevent expenditures of state funds for unnecessary patient care and
maintenance.
Diagnosis before admission is cost effective from another perspective as
well. Assuming that a treatable mental health condition is determined to be
present, different medications and therapy modalities are required for different psychiatric conditions. Certainly, no effective treatment can be accomplished in the absence of an understanding of the underlying condition. 5
80. U.S.

DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL INST. OF MENTAL

HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH STATISTICAL NOTE No. 175 at 26 (1986).
81. See, e.g., CALF. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5151 (West Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 27-10-105(b)(2) (1973 & Supp 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2908(a) (1978); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 3863(2) (1964); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-B:23 (1983); R.I. GEN.
LAWS, § 40.1-5-6(4) (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-3-602(1) (1984).
82. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL INST. OF MENTAL

HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH STATISTICAL NOTE No. 162 at 21 (1983).
83. Id.

84. Parham, 442 U.S. at 629.
85. See Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1139 (N.J.D.C. 1978). Here, the court stated,
"Obviously, before drugs can be prescribed [the] plaintiff's condition must be known." Id.
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Until a diagnostic work-up is at least initiated, no effective treatment for that
condition can even be contemplated.
"A person confined against his will at a state mental institution has 'a
constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give him a
reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition.' ,86
Certainly, then, if children are to be given the same opportunities as adults
for treatment and release into society, then hospital administrators and the
judiciary should not abdicate their responsibilities to these children in need
by postponing the initial diagnostic process.
In the case of children with purported mental or emotional disorders or
disturbances, the need for pre-admission evaluation of the situation is even
more critical than with adults. The Parham Court considered the effect an
adversarial hearing might have on family dynamics once the child is returned to the family after successful hospitalization, and determined that the
potential for family disruption outweighed the child's right to such a hearing. In making this determination, however, the Court failed to consider the
fact that family therapy is frequently an essential treatment modality for
children with mental or emotional problems. Indeed, significant childhood
pathology is often merely a manifestation of problems within the family unit
rather than a product of a particular child's physiology. 7 Unless incarcerated beyond the age of majority, a child admitted for psychiatric treatment
must be returned to the family who committed him against his wishes. Certainly, every effort should be made to deal with any problems that a child
may have in the family setting before the more drastic step of separation and
hospitalization is undertaken.
No

DISTINCTION BETWEEN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL INCARCERATION

"Nowhere in the Constitution is the requirement of due process limited to
criminal matters.",8 8 A commitment of any kind, whether to a prison for an
alleged infraction of the law or to a mental hospital for a presumed mental
illness, constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty for the individual and,
as such, it requires due process protection.8 9 The constitutional safeguards
of due process should attach whenever the likelihood of incarceration exists
86. 422 U.S. 563, 572 (1975) (citing the appellate court opinion). On review, the Supreme
Court did not address this issue.
87. A. BRY, INSIDE PSYCHOTHERAPY 87-102.
88. Mabbutt, Juveniles, Mental Hospital Commitment and Civil Rights: The Case of

Parham v. JR., 19 J. FAM. L. 7, 59 (1980-81).
89. See Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968); Jones v. U.S., 463 U.S.
354 (1983).
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regardless of the location of that incarceration or the age of the person to
be affected.
At the same time the Supreme Court was considering Parham, the District Court of Maryland was considering Johnson v. Solomon. 90 The court in
Johnson refused to distinguish between liberty threatened by criminal proceedings or as a result of civil commitment. The court held that whenever a
"state undertakes to act in parens patriae, it has the inescapable duty to
-

vouchsafe due process," 9 1 which was defined to include both legal counsel

and a corimitment proceeding. 92 Other states are beginning to follow the
Johnson lead in finding that a state's role in the commitment process establishes state action sufficient to invoke federal due process protection. 93 One
state has gone so far as to declare unconstitutional a commitment procedure
that allows the admitting hospital to be the "neutral factfinder" when deter94
mining whether or not to accept a minor for inpatient treatment.
No

DISTINCTION BETWEEN ADULT AND JUVENILE
COMMITMENT STANDARDS

The current standard under which an adult may be involuntarily committed to a mental hospital is one of "clear and convincing evidence of imminent danger to oneself or to others."9 5 Even the proposed legislation in New
York to reduce the evidentiary requirement to a showing of only a "potential
for danger" 96 provides greater protection to the adult than does Parham
which requires no precommitment standard at all. 97 An admission standard
for children that merely requires some evidence that benefit might be obtained from psychiatric treatment leaves open a floodgate for admissions that
90. 484 F. Supp. 278 (D. Md. 1979).
91. Id. at 286.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., P.F. v. Walsh, 648 P.2d 1067 (Colo. 1982).
94. Id. at 1072. The court held that "[g]iven the substantial liberty interest at stake and
the risk of an erroneous admission decision.... the hospital, as the party ultimately responsible for determining whether a child will be admitted, cannot be delegated the legislative responsibility for defining the admission standard." Id. The Walsh court's refusal to allow the
hospital discretion as a "neutral factfinder" was due to the Colorado legislature's failure to
provide standards or limits in the admission statute to guard against arbitrary and inconsistent
application of the admission criteria. A similar criticism was made by the appellants in
Parham regarding the imprecise Georgia commitment criteria for children.
95. See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. 330.1465 (West 1980); Mo. STAT. ANN. §
632.335(4) (Vernon 1988); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15(B) (Anderson 1989); VT. STAT.
ANN. TIT. 18 § 7616(b) (1987); W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4(j)(3) (1986).
96. N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1986, at Cl, col. 1.
97. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 584.
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would be precluded under the standard used to consider adults for
admission.
It is understood by the psychiatric profession that effective therapy is
often dependent upon the cooperation of the patient. Rarely are psychiatric
or psychological conditions wholly treatable or curable by drugs alone.98
Pharmacological intervention is used to better prepare a patient for the individual, 'roup or family sessions that require the participation and cooperation of the patient.9 9 While a pre-admission hearing has the potential to
temporarily disrupt the cohesiveness of a family, it has greater potential to
aid the child in understanding his or her need for hospitalization. A child
who initially rejected the idea of his need for help may better understand his
problem and appreciate the willingness of others to help him if he is given an
opportunity to participate in the decision to get help. Conceivably, a child's
initial participation in his hospitalization process may pave the way for participation in his recovery process.
"Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one attains the age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.""l
The
Parham Court erred in treating the liberty interests of a child differently
from those of an adult. Under medical circumstances which lend themselves
to exact diagnoses, a parent's right to care for his child is less of a judicial
concern. However, when incarceration for an indefinite period of time is at
stake, the deference to parents should be withdrawn and children given the
same protection of their constitutional liberties as adults.
LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE

Assuming that commitment of children would be accomplished under the
same standard of dangerousness used for adults, due process would then
provide that a state cannot constitutionally confine a non-dangerous individual, adult or child, who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself
or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends.'' In
the instance of a child deemed to be emotionally or mentally disturbed, but
98. L. COLEMAN, THE REIGN OF ERROR 151 (1972).
99. J. EWALT, PRACTICAL CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 338 (1957).
100. Parham, 442 U.S. at 627.
101. Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975). Even more recently, the D.C. Court
of Appeals reversed an adult psychiatric commitment where the court was not satisfied that
the trial court had looked into less restrictive alternatives. The court held that "the idea of
requiring the least restrictive appropriate treatment is based on the notion that government
should not restrict the freedom of its citizens to any greater degree than the community needs
require." In re Stokes, No. 85-1249 (D.C. Cir. July 13, 1988).
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not dangerous to himself or others, due process would seem, therefore, to
require something short of the radical deprivation of personal liberty that
hospitalization entails. In such a situation, this author would recommend
the two-tier system alluded to by the Parham Court, but for a different
purpose.
When a child is living at home with his natural parents or guardian, facilities for outpatient therapy should be provided in lieu of inpatient treatment
and indefinite hospitalization. From an economic perspective, the costs for
outpatient treatment would be less. The same therapy could be provided
without the daily "bed and board" expenses. Simultaneously, those persons
who influence and interact with the child, and with whom the child must
interact as well, generally his parents and siblings, will be able to participate
in his recovery. Teaching a family how to cope with a mentally or emotionally disturbed child, or teaching a child how to cope with a disturbed family,
may significantly reduce the possibility ofthe child's need for future therapy.
When a child is a ward of the state, however, the support group provided
by the family is missing. In these cases, if the child is determined not to be
dangerous, group homes may offer a greater opportunity for the child's recovery. If the goal of psychiatric treatment is to return the child to functioning society, providing a "society" for the child may be therapeutic in itself.
Admittedly, group homes, especially for those stigmatized by society, are
difficult to establish within the community. Yet, with the proper public relations and societal acceptance of its responsibility for its less fortunate members, these group homes may prove to be workable alternatives to the
asylum.
For those children, living at home or as wards of the state, who are determined at the appropriate pre-admission hearing to be dangerous, hospitalization should not signal an end to their due process protection. Procedures
should be implemented whereby a child has the same opportunity to request
a discharge hearing as his adult counterpart in the same institution. Justice
Brennan in Parham cited an alarming a 1979 National Institute of Mental
Health study that estimated that one in every four children admitted to state
hospitals can anticipate being permanently hospitalized for the next fifty
years of their lives. 10 2 Failure to provide safeguards for these children
amounts to a form of child abuse by the judicial system, and further results
in the exorbitant waste of scarce mental health funds expended to needlessly
confine these persons.
102. Parham, 442 U.S. at 634, n.21.
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CONCLUSION

The issue of involuntary psychiatric commitment provides the courts with
a difficult balancing test. On one side of the scale is an individual's right to
be different, his personal autonomy and his right to be free from restrictions
on his liberty. On the other side of the scale is society's right to be protected
from dangerous persons and a deeper responsibility to take care of those less
fortunate members of society who cannot properly care for themselves.
When adults are the potential psychiatric patients, the courts have weighted
that scale in favor of personal autonomy and have only allowed commitment
after an appropriate judicial hearing in which a person has been demonstrated to be dangerous to themselves or to society. The Court in Parham v.
J.R. was faced with a similar balancing test; the only distinguishing factor in
that case was the age of the potential patient. The Parham decision was a
poor one. The issue is not one of age, but rather of personal dignity. It is
important for the state to have in place procedures and facilities to help
persons with mental disabilities, but those procedures and facilities should be
available to everyone similarly afflicted, and not dispensed differently because of the age of the patient. Certain persons should not be forced to make
use of these facilities merely because of their age. Adequate due process
safeguards for children will not make mental health care any less accessible
to those children who need it. Rather, by potentially reducing the numbers
of children in state mental hospitals to only those who truly require those
restrictive services, the scarce mental health resources will be more efficiently utilized, and society's beneficent goal of helping its less fortunate children will be better accomplished.
Susan A. Turner

